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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF T1IE

State of Utah
SLL\[ OLSON, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
No. 7801
KEITH "\VINEGAR, doing business
as INTER!IOUNTAIN OIL
DISTRIBUTORS,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT•s BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The records will show that on June 6, 1951, plaintiff
and respondent filed suit to recover the sum of $3778.43
principal with legal interest, attorney's fees in the sum
of $250.00 and costs. On July 31. 195L defendant and
1
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appellant filed a purported Jnotion to dismiss, which
nwtion in fact had no legal meaning or significance, in
as 1nuch as it was not signed by a person duly authorized
to practice law in the state of Utah. It is obvious that
this motion is a nullity, and is of no consequence. Hule
11, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure.
''Every pleading of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed in his individual name by
at least one attorney who js duly licensed to practice
in the state of Utah * * * '*'"
On the 14th day of August, the trial court properly
denied the purported motion to dismiss, and it should be
noted that defendant failed to appear in court to press his
1notion. At this tin1e, the court ordered this instant case
consolidated with the case of ICeith Winegar, d.b.a. Iuternwuntain Oil Distributors v. Slim Olson, Inc. a corporation, Case No. 4293. T. p 31.
1

On the 28th day of August., 1951, defendant filed his
answer in which he admitted that the sum due and owing
plaintiff is $3761.31, with legal interest from the lOth day
of July, 1951, and allegedly tendered this sum to the court,
which in actuality was never tendered in fact - again
showing the defendant realized that his purported motion
was not well taken.
On October 3, 1951, and immediately after the conclusion of the trial of the former case, to-wit: Keith "\Vinegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., No. 4293, and in accordance with
the order of consolidation ( transCI·ipt P. 31) this case was
regularly called for trial; plaintiff and defendant were
both present in court and represented by the respective
counsel at whiC'h time counsel for Keith \Vineg&r objected
2
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to going forward on the grounds that he did not know of
the order of consolidation and that, in any event, he de~ired the in~tant ease to be lward before a judge other
than Judge Hendrieks. \Yhereupon the eourt ordered a
pre-trial to be had. At that time, it was there stipulated
that the only issue was the question of attorney's fees
(transcript P. 32). Nothing was said concerning def~nd
ant 's contention that this clain1 should have been pleaded
as a counterclai1n. At the conclusion of the pre-trial the
court ~et the instant C'ase for trial on OC'toher 9, 1951.
On October 9, 1951, the tnal was had, and the only
under the pre-trial order was that of attorney's
fees. There was no question about the fact that the sum
was owed, but the question of attorney's fees was argued,
and the court allowed defendant one week to brief the
question of whether or not this wa~ a c01npulsory counterclaim, and plaintiff an additional week to answer defendant's brief. After the court had considered both parties
briefs, he entered judg1nent for plaintiff as against defendant, from which this appeal is taken.
i~sue,

Prior to the filing of this action and on ~f arch 24,
1951, defendant had filed an action against plaintiff for
damages caused by an alleged negligent installation of a
filter bag on his diesel engine. On April 9, 1951: plaintiff
in this case filed his answer. It is in this suit--a tort
action concerning a specific in::;ttance and ·sole transaction
-that defendant claims plaintiff should have filed the
instant action on an open aceount for goods sold and
delivered, as a counterclairn. Let it be noted that over
$3,000.00 of plaintiff's account arose after the alleged
neglance of plaintiff's agent, and further, between
$500.00 and $600.00 was incurred after plaintiff's answer
3
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in the tort action had been filed. There is no evidence
that any of the items except the one January 24th, 1951,
had any connection with or involved the diesel truck
which was the subject of the first case.
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT No. I
The trial court did not err in awarding counsel fees.
POINT No. II
The trial court did not err in allowing recovery with
respect to items in the account which appellant alleges
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in another
action.
ARGU~iENT

POINT No. I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN A\VARDING COUNSEL FEES.
Exhibit "A" will show that all of the sales slips in
question contain the following statement on the lower
part of the slip, to-wit:
''Received frorn SLL\I OLSON, INC., the above
described merchandise. The undersigned agrees to
pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees,
if this account is referred to an attorney for collection.''
Each of the slips bears the signature of either appellant or one of his agents.
The law of principal and agency in this sort of case
is so fundamental that it is obvious that there is no merit
in appellants Point No. 1. It is clearly the law, that the
4
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actual location of the
affert its validity.

~ignatnr0

on a rontnwt does not

In 1:2 An1. Juris. p 5r):2. Sel'. 61, it states
Inental law as follows:

thi~

funda-

··A party is bound by a written contract even
thmt-gh his signature does not appear at its end.
(Italics ours) If his nmne, written by himself, appears in any part of the agreement, it 1nay be taken
as his signature, if it were written for the purpose
of giving authenticity to the instrument, and thus
operating as a signature. Therefore, words written
on the back of a contract blank as a portion of the
instrument to be signed by the parties become part
of the obligation, although the signatures are not
below them but are on the preceding page.''
The law thus stated is so elemental that nothing
more need be said.
The sales slips not signed by Keith Winegar, were
signed by his drivers and agents, and it was their duty
to service "\Vinegars cars and trucks. Being in the scope
of their employment, it follows that their signatures on
the sales slips bound the principal \Vinegar with the terms
of the contract.
In 2 Am. Juris. p 70, Sec. 86, the following general
law is stated:

'' * * * * An agent expressly authorized to do a
particular act or acts, or conduct a particular transaction has implied authority to do acts which are
incidental to, usually accompany, or are reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of performance of
5
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the principal act or transaction delegated."
'rhe drivers had the authority to buy gas, supplies
and services on cr~dit, and in order so to do, they had
the authority under general agency principals to sign
sales slips and bind their principal to the terms of the
contract. In any event, this procedure had been carried
on for a long period of time, and Winegar had never
questioned the provision on the sales slip, and had never
given notice that the drivers had no right to bind him on
such provision. Under the law and under the facts, he is
now estopped frorn asserting such a ground upon appeal.
POINT No. II
The trial court did not err in allowing recovery with
respect to items in the account which appellant allege
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in another
action.
It is our contention that, with the possible exception
of the sales slip n1ade up at the time of the alleged negligence of plaintiff's agent, there can be absolutely no
part of plaintiff's claim construed as arising out of the
•'transaction or occurrance'' out of which defendants
cause of a:ction for damages arose.
Defendant's claim arose out of an alleged negligent
act of plaintiff's agent in a particular servicing of his
diesel truck. It is a tort action. It is in no way connected with previous or subsequent sales of supplies and
services. Each sale was a separate act. There was no
contract or agreement between the parties that defendant
would buy his supplies and services at plaintiff's place
of business, nor was there a contract or agreement that
plaintiff would sell to defendant, or would service his
6
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cars and trucks. Defendant n1erely emne in when he de~ired, serviced his vehicles, and signed credit slips for
each transaction. Pnder this fact situation, it is baffling
how defendant reaches the conclusion that the two cases
arose out of the sanw transaction. The most that might
he said on his matter is that plaintiff's claim mi,qht he a
permissive counterrlaim, rPrtainly not a eompulsory one.
After adJ.nission by the defendant throughout the
case, that the account was due and owing, defendant
now is trying to defeat a valid claim for goods, supplies, and services sold and delivered through an imaginary teclmicality. Even if appellants could, by some
stretch of the imagination, place plaintiff's clailn into
the category of a emnpulsory counterclaim, let it be noted
that this case and defendant's previous case for damages
were consolidated after defendant had apparently abandoned his plea that this is a proper case for a compulsory
counterclaim. Further, let it be noted that it was the defendant u.'ho refused to have this case heard at the conclusion of his own case. Had he gone forward, the result
would have been the same as if the second case had been
pleaded as a counterclaim. Appellant, by his own acts,
defeated the manner of procedure which would have, in
effect, 1nade this action one of counterclaim.
Now coming to the rule involved, which reads in part
as follows:
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the s1.tb_ject
matter of the opposing party's claim, * * * * " Rule
7
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13 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
rl,he transaction or occurrence referred to 1n the rule
applied to the Winegar case was the alleged servicing of
his tractor on January 24th, 1951. That is the only transaction alleged by Winegar in the complaint from which
his action in damages stemmed. It may be that the service charge of $11.06 on that day was the service alleged
to have been negligently m~de in the first action, and
Inight be considered as having arisen out of the transaction or occurrence but certainly not more than that. The
purpose of the rule should be considered. The philosophy
of the rule is to discourage separate actions which make
for n1ultiplicity of suits and wherever possible to permit
and smnetimes require combining in one litigation all the
<'ross claims of the parties, particularly where they arise
out of the same transaction. Gallahar v. George H.
Rheman Co., 7 F. R. Serv., 13 F. 12, 50 Fed. Supp., 655,
(D.C.S.D.G.A. 1943.)
''The decided cases indicate that the word'' tram;action'' denotes something done, a completed action
an affair as a whole. In Croft Refrigeration Mark
Co. v. Qninne Picic Brewing Co., 63 Conn., 551, 29
A. 76, 25 L.R.A. 856, the word ''transaction'' is
defined to mean something which has been acted out
to the end. In Cheathmn v. Bobbett, 118 N. C. 343,
24 8. E., 13, it is said the word "transaction" in
N. C. code, in reference to joinder of actions is used
in the sense of the conduct of finishing up an affair
which constitutes as a whole the suhjeet of an
action.''
All of the cases cited by Winegar are cases where
artions have been filed after the original action was com8
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plrted, resulting in continuing litigation and multiplieity
of suits. The present netions wen=- consolidated and opportunity offered to try the two simultaneously, obviating
and cmnplying with the very purpose of the rule.
In \Yillimns v. Robinson, 3 Fed. Rule Serviee, Case 1,
1 F.H.D. 211 (D.C.D.C. 19-10), it was said:
•·The tern1s ''transaction and occurrence'' as
used in Rule 13 (a) include the facts and circumstances out of which a claim may arise and whether
its clain1s arise out of the same transaction or occurrence depends in part on whether the same evidence
u:ill support or refnte both.L vVhere defendant in an
action for 1naintenance filed a counterclailn for
divorce, nmning a co-respondent and the co-respondent answered, denying the charges, and later filed a
separate action for libel and slander against the defendant, it was held that the claim for libel and
slander did not arise out of the transaction or occurrence upon which defendant's counterclaim
against the correspondent was based.'' (Italics ours.)
It will be clearly seen that the proof necessary in both
cases was entirely different.

Courts attempt to adminster justice and equity and
give wide discretion to the trial court in proceeding in
this kind of cases. For instance in Redlop Trucking Corp.
v. Seaboard Freight Lines, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 740,
(D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1940), 4 F. R. Serv., 13 a 11, Case 2:
''A defendant in a federal court filed suit in a
state court on a claim which would constitute a compulsory counterclaim in the former action,''
held the state court action should not be staid. It was
9
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said in Louisville Trust Company v. Glenn, 66 Fed. Supp.
872, a Kentucky case decided in 1946 in an action by the
government to recover unpaid taxes for the taxable years
1941 and 1942 a counterclain1 seeking to set off amounts
improperly collected for the tax year 1943 is not a compulsory but a permissive counterclaim.
In an action against certain labor unions and individual defendants under the Sherman Act defendants
brought a proceeding under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.~., Sec. 107, for damages alleged to have been caused
hy wrongful issuance of injunctions against them, plaintiffs attempted to set up a counterclaim based upon alleged wrongful acts of defendants substantially the same
as those which for1ned the basis of the proceeding under
the Sherman Act, held (1) that such a counterclaim may
not be entertained in a summary proceeding, and (2) that
the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the defendant's claim and, therefore,
could not be maintained. Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment \Vorkers Union, 47 Fed. Supp.
67.
In Kuster Laboratories, Inc. v. Lee, 14 F. R. Serv.
13a.11, Case 1, 10 F. R. D. 351 (D.C.N.D. 1950), the court
in dismissing a counterclaim made the following pertinent finding:
''A compulsory counterclaim must arise 'out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim.' Rule 13 (a)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. * * * * It is patent
that the claim and counterclaim do not arise out of
the same transaction or smne occurrence. Each m11,st

10
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be e8tabl ishrd by distinct proofs."

(Italics

our~).

Referring now to the test ••whether the smne evidence would support or refute both'' the Winegar and the
Olson ra~e8, how could any negligence pleaded in the
\Vinegar case prove or refute the clain1 of Sli1n Olson
for goods, wares and servires sold by hin1 over a period
of five n10nths to 'Vinegar~ Conversely how could the
evidenre in the Slhn Olson case to prove money owing
for goods and wares and services sold to Winegar prove
or defeat vVinegar 's claim for negligence in one only of
approximately 500 separate purchases~
Frmn the foregoing and numerous other cases which
eould be cited, it becmnes apparently certain that the
clai1n contained in the Slim Olson case cannot be considered a compulsory counterclaim. As a matter of fact,
under the authorities we believe that it could not even
becon1e a permissive counterclaim.
In the case of Noel Estate, Inc. v. Dixon and Denny,
et al., 212 La. 313, 31 Southern (2) 810, decided by the
Louisiana Supreme Court May 26, 1947, it was held in
a case where a firrn of attorneys representing a client
over a period of time earned several fees for litigation
handled for the client and finally having collected a
judgment for their client, sought to apply the judgment on
the fees which had been earned in all the cases and where
the client filed suit against the attorneys to recover the
amount of the judgment collected by them and the attorneys attempted to counterclaim their earned fee against
the claim of their client, the court held:
"Attorneys may not in a client's action against
them to recover the proceeds of a judgment re11
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covered by the attorneys for the client, maintain a
plea of set off and compensation based upon unliquidated clairns for fees for various services rendered and suits filed during a period of years."
The court further said:
"The fees and charges claimed in defendant's
reconventional demand ( counterclairn) other than
those for services in the Highway Commission litigation (where the judgrnent was collected) are not connected with or incidental to the subject of the main
a$on herein. This is clearly shown by defendant's
answer, one allegation of which is 'that on or about
during the year 1934 the Noel Estate, Inc. employed
your defendants as attorneys to handle their legal
business and agreed to pay them for assisting in
their office work and giving advice the sum of $50.00
per month, and any other fees for work done were
to be separately adjusted and paid.' * * * * In a
separate suit, however, defendants may seek to
recover s'uch fees and charges and in this connection
all of their rights should and will be reserved."
In D 'Auxy v. DPre, 47 App. Div. 51, 62 N.Y. S., 244,
it appeared that the plaintiff had employed the defendant
to collect a claim which he later assigned to the defendant
and subsequently instituted suit to have the assignment
set aside as being induced by fraud and for an accounting. The defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking to set
off his claim for fees for services rendered the plaintiff
from time to time.L An order overruling plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that since the claim was n~t on the contract,
the defendant's counterclain1 not arising out of or con12
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nccted with the plaintiff's transaction wns nn ind0p0ndent eause of action and could not be set off.
In Big Cola Corp. Y. \Yorld Bottling Co., Ltd. 7
F. R. SerY. 13b .3 Ca~e 1; 13-± F. (2d) 718 (C C A Gth
19-±3) the court in discussing the difference between a
pennissiYe and a cmnpulsory connterclairn said:
••The difference between the cornpulsory requirernent of stating counterclairns under Rule 13
(a) and perrnis~ive provision of stating such clain1s
under Rule 1i (b), depends on whether such claims
arise 'out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of an opposing parties claim.' vVhere
a counterclaim is an essentially independent action
it is a permissive counterclaim; and even where
pleaded in answer to an opposing parties claim, the
trial court is given discretion to order separate trials
of claim and counterclaim."
(Italics ours).
In :Martin v. Throckmartin, 15 Pa. 632, it was held
well settled that an attorney who has collected money for
his client cannot set off against his client's claim for
that money a claim due him for services as counsel for
any proceeding other than that out of which the money
came.
These latter cases, which are similar to the instant
case where Winegar seeks to compel Olson to counterclaim independent claims for goods, wares and services
sold to Winegar other than at the time Olson serviced
' the truck which became the basis of Winegar's action,
hold that such cases are not even permissive counter~- claims and hence could certainly not be comptllsory.

It will he noted under Section (b) of Rule 13 the rule

13
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broadens the scope of 13 (a) by adding
"A pleading may (Italics ours) state as a coun.
terclairn any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
In any event the two cases were consolidated, which gave
\Vinegar every right and benefit he could have obtained
under the rule, even if Olson's claim had formed the basis
of a compulsory counterclairn, which it did not, and so
an analysis of the two clain1s and the procedure followed
leaves Winegar shorn clean of any right, legal or equitable, to atten1pt to defeat the Slim Olson case on a technicality of procedure, and it must be kept in mind that
the rules of procedure are not jurisdictional but are
procedural only and are not intended to defeat legitimate
clain1s.
An analysis of the defendant's authorities cited in his
brief demonstrates the difference between the cases cited
by him and the case at bar. For instance, in the Moore
v. New York Cotton Exchange case it will be noted that
the entire transactions covered arose out of and by virtue
of a contract where the plaintiff sued to have the contract
between the New York Stock Exchange and Western
Union declared to be in violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act, and the defendants set up the defense that
they had refused to install the ticker service, which was
the basis of the contract, but that the plaintiff had never·
theless used their service without right and asked for an
injunction. The court's attention is properly called to the
statement of the Supreme Court in its decision, wherein
it sajd:

14
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· · Tran::mction i~ a word of flexible 1neaninp;. It
may rmnprehend a series of 1nany occurrences, depending not so n1uch upon the in11nediateness of their
connection as upon their logiral relationship.''
\Yherein could it be said that purchases of 1notor fuel,
oil, etr. on entirely separate days for use in entirely
separate units have any logical relationship to the alleged
negligence of Slin1 Olsons on January ~-l- ~
In Doug-las v. \Visconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 11 F. R. Serv. 13a .11, Case 1; 81 F. Supp. lfl7
(D.C.X.D. Ill., 1948), the court quoted the ~foore case
cited by the appellant, as follows:
''The case of ~ioore v. New York Cotton Exchange 1925, 270 U. S. 593, 46 S. Ct. 367, 371, 70
L. Ed. 750, 45 A. L. R. 1370, sets forth the basic
rules for deter1nining whether or not a compulsory
counterclaim exists:
'Two classes of counterclaims thus are provided
for: (a) One 'arising out of the transaction which is
the subject matter of the suit' which must be pleaded; and (b) another '1chich might be the s~tbject
of an independent s~tit in equity' and which may be
brought forward at the option of the defendant."
(Italics our).
The instant case clearly falls into the (b) or second type
of claim set out in this decision.
Again, the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. MusantiPhillips, Inc., where suit was brought by plaintiff for
freight, a counterclaim was filed covering a series of
diversions of a negligent nature, all of which contributed
to a final result-deterioration of a perishable product.

15
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The Eastern Transportation Company case again
is an action for freight upon a single shipment where
the government counterclaimed damages on that particular shipment for demurrage and other expenses, which
was perfectly proper.
In the Advance Thresher Company v. Klein case
suit was brought on a series of notes covering the purchase price of a threshing machine. All of the notes
were related to and a part of the purchase price. It
should be noticed that the contract of purchase and sale
provided for the making of repairs, and the suit resulted
from damages which occurred in making the repairs
''pursuant to the contract between plaintiff and defendant.''
The Storey case cited therein holds that
''The transaction comprehended within the
n1eaning of the section of the code is not limited to
the facts set forth in the complaint but includes the
entire series of facts and mutual conduct of the
parties in the business or proceeding between them,
which formed the basis of the agreement." (Italics
ours).
The agreernent in the Winegar case was that Slim 01sons, Inc. would undertake the servicing of the particuiar
unit in question on January 24, and would use due diligence and care in doing so, and the plaintiff, Winegar,
would pay the reasonable costs thereof. That is the entire transaction. The fallacy of Winegar's position is
clearly pointed out in the second quote from the Storey
case on page 12 of his brief.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in awarding counsel fees
in this action. Under well-known and well-established
contract and agency law, appellant was bound by the
tern1s of the contract, as represented by the sales slips
signed by hin1self and by his agents acting in his behalf.
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in
holding that this action is not barred under Rule 13 (a) of
Utah Rules of Civil Proeedure. It is obvious under the
law, and under this particular fact situation, that the
open account was not, and could not be found to eomprise
a part of the same transaction or occurrence that appellants claim for dmnages arose from. Appellant claimed
damages in his original cause of action, from alleged negligent work done to his truck by respondent's agent on
one particular day. He does not and cannot connect his
alleged damage to any of the other transactions. The
fact that appellant purchased supplies and services prior
to the act he complained of, and subsequent to said act,
has no bearing on his original action. The facts necessary to prove appellant's case are entirely different from
the ones necessary to prove respondent's case. At the
very most, it might be said that this action might have
constituted a permissive counterclaim. It is impossible
to, find any abuse of discretion by the trial court, and
its ruling and decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
HUGGINS & HUGGINS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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